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A counter-hegemonic rule of law?  
Johanna del Pilar Cortes-Nieto and Giedre Jokubauskaite 
 
Contribution to the book symposium ’The Rule of Law in Transnational Development 
Projects: Private Actors and Public Chokeholds’ 
 
Introduction 
We are sympathetic to the research aims of the two books examined by this symposium, and their 
desire to understand law’s role in generating and contesting social injustice. We are also intrigued by 
the proposal in the introduction to this symposium, notably to expand the normative reach of the 
rule of law ideal to private actors, in order to transform it into an ally of counterhegemonic action. In 
our research we share a similar research focus (development projects), methodology (case studies), 
and concerns (harmful effects of development interventions) with the authors of the two books. 
Accordingly, in this contribution, we want to think together with the editors of the symposium – by 
examining the case study of the Hidroituango project in Colombia (hereinafter – Hidroituango) – 
whether the rule of law can indeed be reimagined to limit the arbitrary exercise of power by private 
actors, and what benefits this might create for dealing with social injustice. However, since neither 
Bhatt nor Lander advance an explicit account of rule of law in their books, our critique in this piece is 
addressed not at them, but rather at the theorists and advocates of rule of law as a political ideal.  
Based on our research on Hidroituango and beyond, we agree with the authors of the symposium 
that the rule of law in its ‘narrow’ and simplistic form has been closely aligned with neoliberal 
rationality. This is because the rule of law is often invoked to protect property rights of transnational 
funders, to create stable and predictable legal environments for their investments, and to ensure 
that their contractual claims are immunised from domestic political contestation. As Lander puts it, 
the rule of law has become “a code for certainty and stability”, which protects investors from state 
interventions and communities’ contestation (p. 228). Both Lander and Bhatt show that the rule of 
law has been instrumental in ‘locking’ investors’ interests and thus making them safe from disputes 
under national legal systems. In a similar vein, Cutler and Gill claim that this ‘narrow` investor-
friendly version of the rule of law underpins a new global (and national) constitutional order in which 
investors have rights but not duties, while states and local communities have duties toward 




Hence, the problem is not just that the rule of law has not been implemented appropriately, but 
rather that some of its constitutive elements, such as an individualistic conception of property rights 
or its focus on predictable outcomes for private actors, has facilitated the expansion of private 
power at the expense of local communities. From this point of view, the rule of law represents what 
Lorde (1984) calls ‘master’s tools’, i.e. the means that are used to institutionalise injustice and 
oppression in the first place. In this contribution we accept the provocation of this symposium, and 
wish to consider whether this particular ‘master’s tool’ can indeed be reimagined, revamped and 
used in the context of transnational development projects in a way that is helpful to social 
movements and thinkers contesting economic globalisation and neoliberal models of development.   
Krygier (2008, 2016), whose account is central to the proposal of this symposium, views the rule of 
law as an analytical framework that should be geared towards advancing a value of non-arbitrariness 
in political systems. His teleological approach emphasises the function of the rule of law to curb 
arbitrary exercises of power. This suggests that despite his commitment to Selznick’s ‘law in context’ 
approach (Taekema, 2019), Krygier believes in a possibility of separating the universal/normative 
rule of law ideal from the hegemonic and context-specific institutions, and thus from bad practices 
and discourses. Drawing on this separation, Krygier is optimistic about the possibility of advancing 
the rule of law’s core value through institutional arrangements that are amenable to the cultural, 
economic and political traditions of each society. We, however, remain sceptical of this possibility. 
Looking at rights and property as core legal conditions that have shaped the encounter between the 
Hidroituango project and affected communities, we argue that the rule of law ideal is inevitably 
derived from concrete practices, beliefs and historical pedigrees (Cheesman, 2018), which in case of 
development projects follow the mainstream blueprint of economic development. Therefore, we are 
doubtful of the possibility of ‘rebooting’ institutions such as private property or procedural rights 
through a functional definition of the rule of law, given that a pedigree of (neo)liberal economic 
development remains a powerful and dominant element in its social and political DNA.   
In addition to our scepticism about the possibility of a more contextual and open understanding of 
the rule of law, we also see a fundamental tension at the heart of the rule of law idea, which is a 
promise of predictability and certainty, while also claiming to have the capacity to resolve political 
conflicts and address injustice1. In short, a tension between stability and change. Through our case 
study we observe that the potential of an unpredictable outcome, where new meanings and ways of 
moving forward are created and put in action, is central to realising the ideal of inclusive 
 
1 Krygier sees justice and rule of law are separate ideals; however, we even in this ‘separationist’ view, there 
exists a link between the two, because non-arbitrariness is still not an intrinsic value, but rather is defined in 
functional terms (Taekema 2019; Krygier 2018). 
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development and, ultimately, justice. Political creativity gives social movements, through resistance 
and contestation, a chance of creating alternatives to extant orders and practices of exploitation and 
domination. We argue that this political space for the creation of alternatives – rather than further 
institutionalisation and enhanced legality – is crucial for breaking through the logic of development 
machinery and its oppressive effects on local communities. However, this openness is in tension 
with the aims of predictability and certainty. In this respect, the emphasis of this symposium on 
rethinking the rule of law seems helpful to an extent, but also misplaced; and including private 
actors into its ambit risks further legitimising hegemonic agendas. 
 
2. Arbitrariness in Hidroituango  
In order to substantiate our theoretical claims, we now turn attention to the construction of a 
regional mega dam, Hidroituango, which is located at the heart of the Colombian mountains on the 
Cauca River’s basin. Hidroituango’s construction involved not only damming 38 square kilometres of 
land previously devoted to agricultural, artisanal mining, fishing and other economies of subsistence, 
but also led to displacements, dispossessions, death threats and physical violence. Peasants, 
artisanal miners, fishermen and other groups directly affected by the dam have gathered in Ríos 
Vivos, a social movement that engaged in a rich repertoire of resistance against the project, 
including strategic litigation before national courts and international bodies2. Hidroituango’s radical 
effects on the natural and social environments of the Cauca River basin are representative of the 
impacts of large-scale infrastructure projects more generally. However, due to its position in a region 
that is already affected by armed conflict, Hidroituango is marked by higher levels of violence and 
security concerns than many development projects. Because of this, Hidroituango shows the 
powerful legitimising role that law can play, even in difficult social contexts where legal justifications 
operate simultaneously with military coercion and non-state violence. 
EPM [Empresas Publicas de Medellin], a state-owned enterprise of one of Colombia’s richest regions, 
Antioquia, is the company implementing the project. Although not a private entity in a formal sense, 
EPM is a parent company of over 50 companies operating in Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico 
and Panama.3 EPM is also driven by a commercial rationale and associated objectives, with 
aspirations of exporting electricity to neighbouring countries, attracting capital from global financial 
 
2 While not everyone living in the Hidroituango area opposes the project, our analytical emphasis is on those 
people who resist the project due to its far-reaching negative impacts on their ways of living. 
3 Information based on the EMP’s official website, see https://www.epm.com.co/site/investors/general-
information/investor-faq (last accessed 06 November 2020) 
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markets, and ensuring market dominance in the region.4 In this sense, it is a ‘transnational private 
actor’ that falls under the conceptual framework of this symposium. Similarly to other development 
projects discussed by Bhatt and Lander, Hidroituango was also funded by a wide range of 
international institutions and investors, some of which played an important role in determining the 
course of this project, but which will not be the focus of the present analysis. 
In 2018, a part of the operational structure of Hidroituango’s dam collapsed due to flooding caused 
by heavy rains, coupled with design failures. This exposed an already contested project to further 
controversy and calls for accountability concerning faulty project design and decisions that continue 
to harm the local population. Rios Vivos had spent over a decade contesting the rationale of the 
project at first, and then demanding for an adequate treatment after the harm has been caused. 
They have highlighted not only problems related to land loss and unfair compensation, but also 
connections between Hidroituango and the use of violence by both state and non-state actors. From 
the perspective of this social movement, the exercise of power in Hidroituango has been indeed 
arbitrary, and this arbitrariness arguably becomes more obvious if we extend the rule of law analysis 
to EPM, as discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Krygier (2008, 11-12) explains that arbitrariness is not desirable for two reasons: because the 
arbitrary exercise of power is ‘frightening’, and because it is ‘confusing’. Building on his 
conceptualisation, it can be said that the arbitrary exercise of power is one that is (a) unchecked, and 
(b) unpredictable. Krygier (2016, 203-205) later added another element to his account of 
arbitrariness, (c) non-participation by those affected by the exercise of power. Arguments in 
Lander’s and Bhatt’s books help us to explain why and through what mechanisms, despite elaborate 
governance framework in place, the authority of EPM over members of Rios Vivos evaded all 
scrutiny based on fundamental rights’ protection or democratic participation.  
As in the cases that Bhatt analyses, EPM was not only able to exercise power without scrutiny, but 
also delegated authority to other private actors. For instance, private contractors hired by EPM 
conducted social and environmental assessments, and designed resettlement and compensation 
plans without independent oversight. In this process, artisanal miners who have a partially nomadic 
lifestyle were excluded from the original impact assessment (similar issues identified in Mongolia by 
Lander, 2020, p. 113).  The lack of transparency has made it difficult for Ríos Vivos to contest the 
assessments, which defined their rights to land and compensation, among others5. Furthermore, 
 
4 Although formally owned the Municipality of Medellin, EPM regularly issues bonds in Colombian and 
international capital markets (ibid.). 
5 Ríos Vivos is currently demanding a new social assessment based on a comprehensive appraisal of affected 
people https://riosvivoscolombia.org/en/who-we-are/brief-history-of-our-resistance-against-hidroituango/   
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since affected communities were not recognised as indigenous groups, they have been denied free, 
prior and informed Consent-like mechanisms (issues with non-recognition explained by Bhatt, 2020 
pp. 23-24). For people exposed to such an ‘unchecked’ authority, the actions of EPM – that is 
working closely with military forces and has alleged links with non-state armed groups (Afanador, 
2018)– were, and indeed remain, frightening.   
Generally, national legislation has also been ineffective in protecting the right of Rios Vivos members 
to participate in decisions that directly affect them.  Like in Mongolia (Lander, pp. 197-198), legal 
rules have been interpreted in ways that prevent effective participation from affected communities. 
For instance, Colombian national legislation allows communities to call for a hearing in the context 
of environmental licencing procedures. However, in Hidroituango’s case, only regional governmental 
authorities were invited, while the participation of grass movements and local communities was 
restricted6. Hearings were also called in towns, but farmers who live in remote areas could not 
attend or simply were  not informed. Moreover, compensation plans were grounded on an 
individualistic and profit-seeking conception of property, which, as in case of pastoralists in 
Mongolia (Bhatt 2020, p.125-136), could not capture cultural and spiritual relationships that local 
communities have developed with their territory – an issue discussed later in this paper.  
All in all, once we adjust the lens of the rule of law analysis to cover profit seeking decision-makers 
such as EPM, the omnipotent nature of their decisions vis-à-vis the local population becomes 
apparent. It therefore becomes difficult to claim that their actions were legitimate, however, many 
of them are undertaken under the umbrella of the rule of law. Furthermore, although the rule of law 
analysis could indeed expose the lack of checks and balances in exercising authority, the process and 
the outcome of decision-making in Hidroituango were both arguably highly predictable, i.e. fully in 
line with the second criterion of non-arbitrariness identified above. Plans announcing the intention 
to construct Hidroituango were made public as early as 1997 (Consorcio Integral, 2007) threatening 
to displace local groups from their land and take away their livelihoods. While many members of 
Rios Vivos were not aware of the project or its impacts until late in the planning process, this does 
not mean that knowing about the project earlier would have changed its outcome.  
From this experience of local groups encountering development planning as a fait accompli, it seems 
to us that the rule of law in the context of economic development cannot escape the risk of being 
conflated with the notion of efficiency. Predictability is often equated with reducing transaction 
costs as a sign of efficiency.  Therefore, there is a high risk that efficiency in achieving developmental 
aims is read as calling for reducing dialogue and opportunities for contestation. This intimate link 
 
6 Information in this section is based on the interviews with Rios Vivos members (on file with authors).  
6 
 
between efficiency, predictability and the rule of law constitutes a conceptual limit of the rule of 
law’s normative potential for counterhegemonic action. In the next sections, we explain why that is 
the case, even if a promise of predictable development outcomes is extended beyond private actors, 
to those who are exposed to their operations.  
 
3. The indeterminacy of rights 
Rights are the hallmark of substantive or ‘thick’ conceptions of the rule of law. They are mainly 
conceived as protective shields that define claims and liberties on the one hand, and duties and 
liabilities on the other hand (Quong, 2013). They protect the interests and freedoms of 
rightsholders, by imposing restrictions on right bearers’ behaviour. In this traditional sense, rights 
provide predictability and certainty to people’s interactions, while protecting rightsholders from 
arbitrary exercises of power. When rights as protective shields are taken to the contexts of 
developmental interventions, they are usually portrayed as allies of affected communities. For 
instance, Bhatt advocates the recognition and proper implementation of land rights and the right to 
free, prior and informed consent for indigenous peoples as a remedy that could lead to clearer and 
fairer outcomes for affected communities (p. 195). On the contrary, when rights are narrowly 
interpreted and fail to protect local communities, this is regarded as a violation of the rule of law 
and a failure of political and judicial systems. 
As the Hidroituango case illustrates, this view of rights as protective shields often loses sight of other 
functions that rights have and which rest on their intrinsically indeterminate nature. Besides 
functioning as protective shields, rights are governing techniques. As some critical readings suggest, 
rights can  be deployed to govern rightsholders’ behaviours, to neutralise and discipline opposition 
to governmental interventions, or to produce subjectivities which render people as ‘governable 
subjects’  (Sokhi-Bulley, 2016). Narrow constructions of rights, which impose restrictions on the ways 
they can be exercised or that limit rightsholders’ remedial and political aspirations, are examples of 
how rights are deployed to govern dissenting populations.  By the same token, rights are often 
deployed by social movements and social groups to shape the behaviour of powerful actors. In this 
sense, rights provide hope and hold emancipatory potential.  
To sum up, when rights are understood as governing techniques, besides their protective function, 
two additional functions emerge: on the one hand, they can be deployed as regulatory and 
disciplining techniques aligned with exercises of power akin to domination. On the other hand, rights 
can be a means of resistance and contestation (Wall, 2012). The emancipatory potential of rights 
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(Wall, 2012) rests precisely on their indeterminacy and renders them in a way unpredictable. This 
reveals a tension between definition and openness that is at the heart of rights. Definition might be 
helpful for protection purposes, but at the same, time the processes of rights determination (of 
turning rights into positive law) opens spaces for control and domination. Indeterminacy, on the 
other hand, may impair rights’ protective power (particularly before courts) but at the same time 
holds the promise of more radical changes while allowing social movements to articulate novel 
demands before the political system. 
The Colombian constitution contains a long list of rights, which include social, economic, cultural and 
environmental rights. In 1991, when the current Colombian constitution was drafted, rights were 
thought to be good means to address the causes and consequences of the ongoing internal civil 
conflict, including poverty and inequality. The Constitutional Court of Colombia (CCC) and other 
national tribunals have keenly protected the rights recognised in the constitution. Myriads of judicial 
decisions have granted protection to indigenous communities, peasants and vulnerable population 
affected by development projects. This court has not only recognised the right of indigenous peoples 
and other ethnic minorities to free, prior and informed consent, it has also protected the right to 
health, food, decent housing, work and participation of communities affected by development 
projects (Rodríguez, 2014). 
Despite the above, after more than a decade of legal contestation, Ríos Vivos have succeeded in very 
few legal battles over their rights. Most judicial decisions have tilted the balance in favour of the 
project, all anchored in thin conceptions of participation, property rights and access to justice. An 
example of this is how both the environmental authorities and courts approached the rights of 
Hidroituango’s affected communities. For ANLA [National Authority of Environmental Licenses],7 
participatory requirements were fulfilled by inviting local authorities and members of the 
community to hearings aimed at spreading information about the project and collecting data for 
managing environmental impacts. Based on this assumption, ANLA approved the environmental 
impact assessment conducted by Hidroituango (Consorcio Integral, 2007), a decision upheld by 
national courts.8 According to these authorities, local communities do not have a legitimate claim to 
further participation, and in particular, they do not have veto power. Furthermore, for courts, access 
to compensation demands clearly defined property rights, i.e. rights to carry mining activities in 
areas affected by the project, which many local communities lack.9  
 
7 Abbreviation in Spanish  
8 Sección Primera de la Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo del Consejo de Estado (2018) ‘Auto del 30 de 
mayo de 2018 Radicación 11001032400020170013000’. Bogotá. 
9 Corte Constitucional de Colombia (2012) ‘Sentencia T-447’. 
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We see a sort of a paradox here. In legal arenas, rights have not extended their protective shield to 
the communities affected by Hidroituango. Narrow constructions of rights have been advanced in 
the name of the rule of law. Courts’ emphasis on bureaucratic and procedural requirements, 
coupled with demands of clearly defined property rights,10 have left affected communities 
unprotected.  In the long run, this is arguably meant to create more predictable development 
outcomes for the businesses and oppositional movements alike, by asserting that rights-based 
challenges to economic objectives would not succeed, notwithstanding harms caused. In this way, 
rights have been instrumental in neutralising opposition to the dam. Nevertheless, the idea of rights 
continues to have a central role in Rios Vivos’ contestation strategies.  
An explanation to this paradox might be that rights enable communities affected by injustices and 
arbitrariness to articulate claims that are often invisible to the legal system. They allow rendering 
visible before the law other ways of being and living together, marginalised by the modern and 
western underpinnings of liberal law. Against this backdrop, it is possible to understand Rios Vivos’ 
claim to a right to territory. Reference to ‘territory’ (rather than property) highlights the relationship 
between human and non-human agents – including rivers, mountains and animals – which are not 
coded into the anthropocentric and utilitarian analysis of ANLA, EPM or domestic courts. These 
spiritual bonds of communities with animals, mountains and the river cannot be understood through 
the lenses of property rights and pecuniary damages. For Rios Vivos, the indeterminacy of rights 
works as a sort of ‘crack’ in the legal system, which, by opening spaces for change, enables 
resistance and contestation. In this sense, rights provide hope to oppositional movements and hold 
emancipatory potential. On the whole, this feature of indeterminacy of rights calls into question 




With the acquiescence of governmental authorities, Hidroituango placed property rights at the 
centre of its compensation scheme (Consorcio Integral, 2007). Compensation was allocated 
according to the quality of property rights that people were able to prove, with artisanal gold miners 
receiving nearly nothing as they usually lack mining licences and undertake their activities on public 
 
10 Corte Constitucional de Colombia (2012) ‘Sentencia T-447’; Sala Segunda de Oralidad del Tribunal 





land. For the project promoters, property rights are the best distributive criteria for compensation 
purposes: they are a legally justified criterion that provides certainty and predictability about who 
ought to be compensated while contributing to ‘distributive fairness’ (the more precarious are the 
rights, the lower the compensation).  
The problem with structuring compensations schemes according to the quality of property rights is 
that they do not account for all the types of relationships that communities affected by Hidroituango 
have with their territory. Property rights under Colombian law, following the liberal legal tradition,  
are grounded in an individualistic conception of a juridical subject (Gill, 2008, p. 164). The property 
owner is conceived as a sort of possessive sovereign whose rationality is expressed in terms of profit 
seeking and accumulation (Cotula, 2017). Property’s main purpose is to grant owners control over 
flows of income derived from the thing owned, while at the same time preventing others from using 
or extracting value from it (Gill, 2008, p. 166). This model involves a particular spatiality: the land is 
parcelled out into plots setting apart neighbours (Blomley, 2020). By excluding others, fences and 
borders prevent quarrels and secure owners’ private uses. Therefore, property protects the owner’s 
interests from external interventions, while also preventing conflicts over land. 
This understanding of property rights as relational yet exclusionary spaces under the western legal 
tradition tends to distribute power in a way that renders communities such as those in the 
Hidroituango area vulnerable to the arbitrary exercise of power. That is because this focus on the 
property owner leads to a hierarchy of rights, which structure the use, occupation and possession of 
land, and which also distributes power among people with interests and activities in a given 
territory. Within this hierarchy, most power is allocated to the individual owner, based on the 
assumption that the legally recognized right to property is the most important relation that a person 
can have with a thing. People who develop other types of territorial relationships become subjected 
to the owner’s power and excluded from the property. In this way, ‘property law also structures 
interlocking relations of vulnerability and privilege’ (Blomley, 2020 p. 41). Not only does this model 
not protect territorial relationships different than ownership, but it also provides grounds for 
arbitrariness as it privileges owners over everyone else. 
As a social relationship, property is contingent. What Blomley names ‘the Lockean property model’ 
or the ‘ownership model’, is not a universal arrangement (p. 49). It is a product of social struggle 
(Blomley, 2020, p. 49) Therefore, other forms of territorial arrangements are possible. This is 
precisely what eco-territorial movements like Ríos Vivos are looking for: to make visible other types 
of territorial relationships that are not protected and even threatened by the ownership model 
(Escobar, 2015; Svampa, 2019). Therefore, even if communities like those affected by Hidroitango 
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were granted exclusionary property rights, it would arguably not be enough to protect the cultural 
and ancestral relationships they have with their territories.  
Lander generally appears to be critical of the protective function of land rights. She draws attention 
to Mongolia’s post-communist constitution, where the customary land use rights of pastoralist 
communities appear to be protected by the state’s commitment to develop the economy ‘based on 
all forms of property’ (both public and private), as a means of preventing communal land 
privatisation and maintaining the pastoral economy (Lander, 2020, p. 95). However, constitutional 
protections have not delivered. Pastoralists have been deprived not only from property but also 
from use rights in the context of state highly dependent on extractive businesses where investors 
have been given greater powers at the expense of local communities.  Admittedly, it can be argued 
that Mongolia’s example is context specific, and that in any case herders were not granted 
exclusionary rights as according to the Mongolian constitution the state kept ownership over 
pastureland and subsoil.  Nonetheless, the question of whether property rights assigned to 
communities always fails to protect them, or only in some instances, is beside the point for our 
analysis. That is because our claim is that even under a situation of strong protection of land through 
property rights, the western conception of property is likely to be at odds with alternative visions of 
development that indigenous and local traditional communities tend to advance and support. The 
liberal ownership model of property rights not only renders invisible before the law territorial 
relationships that are central to these visions alternative to development, but also imposes a 
particular grammar to talk about land, which risks undermining the very practices at the heart of 
those alternatives. 
While this ‘western model of property rights’ is not by default included in the concept of rule of law 
and therefore might appear of no relevance to the focus of this symposium, in practice in the 
Hidroituango case, private property has been central to the quest for predictability and non-
arbitrariness. This goes hand in hand with traditional approaches to development economics 
according to which, without such protection of identifiable property rights, there can be no 
economic development that generates profit and subsequent wealth to individuals and states 
(Krever, 2018). The premise here is that property rights afford certainty to economic transactions, 
facilitate trade and promote efficient outcomes. For that reason, property rights, economic 
development, and the quest for non-arbitrariness in pursuit of the rule of law appear to us as 
intrinsically connected ideals that are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to separate in practice. 
Accordingly, rule of law and the exclusionary notion of property explained in this section, cannot be 
either analytically or ideologically separated in a meaningful way.  
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As in the case of rights, we take issue with property because although it might signal predictability 
and certainty, from the point of view of social movements such as Rios Vivos, property might 
frustrate change in terms of legal protections for other types of territorial relationships and, more 
broadly, alternatives to development. Accordingly, local communities like Rios Vivos can only benefit 
from the rule of law as an ideal if they were willing to surrender their non-exclusionary and 
relational understanding of territory in their pursuit of better legal entitlements or compensation.  
This might indeed lead to more predictable outcomes (although Lander’s analysis suggests that it 
would not always be the case), but any discussion following such renunciation would take place in 
predominantly western economic, political, and legal terms. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The question that guided our analysis in this paper was whether or not there is a possibility of 
reimagining the rule of law ideal in a way what advances the causes of social movements that 
contest development projects. Our answer to this question is a qualified ‘no’. Given how intimately 
the rule of law is connected with modern liberal worldview and functioning of capitalist economic 
systems, including the notions of efficiency, predictability and exclusionary property rights, we do 
not see how it can create spaces for open dialogue between different worldviews and ways of being 
that are so often at stake in development projects. In this sense, the ‘usefulness’ of rule of law to 
social movements would depend on the willingness of the local groups to embrace the path of 
mainstream economic development. We do however accept that the rule of law has some critical 
purchase in highlighting the extent to which private power operates unchecked, without sufficient 
participation, and arbitrarily; although arguably the argument about arbitrariness, non-participation 
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